The Economic Reality Behind the 1821 Greek War of Independence

When the Revolution erupted in 1821, Greece had no real financial infrastructure.

The Greek War of Independence is often remembered as a heroic struggle fought with swords and rifles, forged in the flames of nationalism and sacrifice. But beneath the battlefield valor and stirring rhetoric

lay a far more complex and rarely told story—one of financial improvisation, institutional birth pains, and a desperate scramble for survival in economic terms. How did a stateless, unrecognized, and unstructured nation manage to finance a prolonged war against one of the world’s largest empires?

When the Revolution erupted in 1821, Greece had no real financial infrastructure. There was no centralized treasury, no taxation system, and no international access to capital. The few economic resources that existed—such as the modest fund controlled by the secret society Filiki Eteria—were insufficient to meet the enormous demands of a war that would drag on for nearly a decade. The uprising began with enthusiasm, but without money.

In the absence of a functioning state apparatus, early funding efforts were patchwork and often chaotic. Resource collection came through a mishmash of methods, ranging from the brutal—looting, ransom demands, and forced seizures of property—to more structured approaches like local fundraising drives, ad hoc taxation, and support from wealthy members of the Greek diaspora. Philhellenes from across Europe and the United States also provided financial aid, driven by romantic ideals of classical Greece and the belief in a Christian struggle against Ottoman rule.

Despite this improvised start, the revolutionary leadership recognized that survival depended on creating some kind of fiscal order. Gradually, institutions began to emerge. National funds were established to centralize revenue, ministries were formed, and committees took shape to oversee administrative functions. The National Assemblies—embryonic forms of representative governance—attempted to provide political legitimacy and a sense of accountability. Even amidst civil war and foreign threats, efforts were made to manage money, distribute supplies, and maintain at least the appearance of governance.

Interestingly, the revolutionary authorities did not completely discard the financial practices of the Ottoman Empire. Instead, they adapted several Ottoman administrative mechanisms—such as tax farming and head tax registers—to suit their new political reality. This pragmatic reuse of familiar systems allowed for a degree of continuity, however flawed, and made it easier to extract resources from local communities in the name of the national cause.

A more structured effort to control the war’s financial dimensions came during the Second National Assembly in 1823, which produced the first rudimentary national budget. While far from comprehensive, it marked a shift toward long-term planning and laid early foundations for what would later become the Greek state’s fiscal apparatus.

Nevertheless, it soon became clear that domestic sources alone could not sustain the war effort. The revolutionaries turned to the international financial markets—specifically, to Britain. Securing foreign loans became not only an economic necessity but a political strategy: obtaining money from European powers implied recognition and support. Two major loans were secured from British lenders, but both were riddled with problems. The terms were harsh, the intermediaries numerous, and the actual sums that reached Greece were a fraction of what had been agreed. The first loan in 1824 was nominally £800,000; only about £300,000 made it to Greek hands. The second, in 1825, was for £2 million—yet only £100,000 and some supplies ever arrived.

These loans, while vital, introduced a host of new complications. Financial mismanagement, corruption, and internal rivalries erupted over how the funds were used. Prominent foreign supporters of the Revolution, such as the American doctor and philhellene Samuel Howe, openly criticized the squandering of funds. Howe lamented that less than a sixth of the borrowed money reached the fighters who needed it most. The Scottish historian George Finlay, known for his cool, unsentimental view of the Revolution, harshly condemned the excesses, bribery, and conspicuous displays of wealth by members of the revolutionary leadership.

And yet, amid all this chaos, something remarkable happened. Out of necessity, Greece began to build institutions. Even in the middle of a war, the foundations of public financial management were laid. The establishment of Greece’s first ministries, the early national budgets, and eventually the creation of the Court of Audit in 1829 signaled a slow but determined shift toward statehood. Practices such as promissory notes and war bonds emerged as innovative responses to the chronic lack of liquidity—primitive, yet effective ways to keep the economy moving in wartime conditions.

The economic history of the Greek Revolution teaches us that the creation of a state is never just about military victories or political declarations. It is also about the difficult, often invisible work of building institutions, managing scarce resources, and navigating the temptations of power and money. Despite serious missteps, the financial dimension of the 1821 Revolution played a crucial role in the eventual formation of the modern Greek state.

More than two centuries later, the legacy of those early decisions—both the achievements and the failings—still echoes through Greek public life.

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